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14	UNITED STATES I	DISTRICT COURT
15	UNITED STATES I	DISTRICT COURT
13	DISTRICT O	FNEVADA
16	District	
10		
17	ORACLE USA, INC., a Colorado corporation;	Case No 2:10-cv-0106-LRH-PAL
	ORACLE AMERICA, INC., a Delaware	
18	corporation; and ORACLE INTERNATIONAL	
	CORPORATION, a California corporation,	PLAINTIFFS ORACLE USA, INC.,
19		ORACLE AMERICA, INC., AND
	Plaintiffs,	ORACLE INTERNATIONAL
20	V.	CORPORATION'S REPLY IN SUPPORT
		OF MOTION FOR PRESERVATION
21	RIMINI STREET, INC., a Nevada corporation;	ORDER [REDACTED]
	SETH RAVIN, an individual,	
22		
	Defendants.	
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I. INTRODUCTION

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2 Oracle's motion seeks an order requiring Rimini to prepare forensic images of the 3 computer hard drives of no more than 60 employees with relevant evidence because such images 4 are necessary to preserve crucial evidence that otherwise will be lost. 5 It is no answer for Rimini to say it has taken steps to preserve other evidence, such as 6 information on Rimini's servers and email. Oracle has grave concerns about what Rimini has 7 done to preserve that evidence, particularly given Rimini's ever-shifting claims about what 8 measures it has taken. The issue on this motion is whether Rimini has adequately preserved the 9 evidence on its employees' computer hard drives. And there is nothing in Rimini's opposition to 10 show that evidence has been adequately preserved. 11 For example, Rimini concedes that it failed to take simple, easy steps to preserve instant 12 messages ("IMs") until August 2010, seven months after this lawsuit was filed and nearly two 13 years after Rimini anticipated this lawsuit. Rimini cannot dispute that recovering the IMs that 14 have been deleted before and during this lawsuit will only be possible with forensic images of 15 employee hard drives, and that unless forensic images are taken now, those deleted IMs will be 16 even more difficult – if not impossible – to recover later. 17 Evidence on individual employee hard drives, of which IMs are but one important 18 example, will be critical. Rimini's central defense in this case is that it has careful safeguards to 19 make sure that Oracle's intellectual property is copied and used only in ways Rimini claims it is 20 permitted to copy and use them. Evidence disproving Rimini's assertions – showing what 21 Rimini employees *actually do* – will be found on Rimini's employees' hard drives. That is 22 particularly true where there are efforts to conceal wrongdoing. 23 24 25 **26** 27 28

2		
3	Rimini repeatedly says that Oracle never asked it to preserve IMs. That is incorrect.	
4	More than a year before this case was filed, and then again three days after this case was filed,	
5	Oracle sent letters to Rimini demanding that Rimini preserve all potentially relevant information,	
6	and Rimini cannot deny that IMs contain such information. Thereafter, Oracle specifically asked	
7	Rimini to preserve "all communications" among Rimini employees about downloading and	
8	copying Oracle software, which obviously includes the very IMs that Rimini failed to preserve.	
9	Rimini knew that it had relevant IMs, and thus Rimini knew it should preserve them.	
10	Nor should Rimini be permitted to avoid its obligations by saying it will only live up to	
11	them if Oracle agrees to pay Rimini's expenses. Oracle has borne the substantial costs of	
12	preserving its own evidence, including forensic images of approximately 200 custodians'	
13	computers. It is Rimini's obligation to preserve its data, and Rimini's failure to take other timely	
14	and adequate preservation efforts – such as preserving IMs – makes forensic imaging crucial.	
15	Oracle should not be required to bear the costs of Rimini's error, particularly by issuing the	
16	blank check Rimini has sought to cover whatever costs Rimini decides to run up.	
17	Oracle should not have to pay to make up for Rimini's failures. However, if the Court	
18	does conclude that some measure of cost-sharing is appropriate, Oracle respectfully submits that	
19	the forensic imaging should be conducted at Oracle's direction or at the direction of a court-	
20	appointed neutral, to ensure that these preservation efforts, at the very least, are adequate and that	
21	Oracle has some control over the costs incurred.	
22	II. ARGUMENT	
23	As shown below, after Rimini anticipated litigation, it failed to take necessary measures	
24	to preserve evidence on individual employee hard drives, including IMs. As a result, files have	
25	already been deleted, and forensic images are a necessary step to preserve what remains of those	
26	files and ensure that additional files are not deleted.	
27	A. Rimini Failed to Take Adequate Preservation Measures	
28	Rimini concedes that probable litigation creates a duty to preserve evidence in advance of	

1	suit. (Opp. at 9.) Rimini does not contest any of the facts that show that Rimini saw litigation
2	with Oracle as probable well in advance of this lawsuit's filing:
3	• in December 2008, Rimini threatened Oracle with antitrust claims and Oracle put
4	Rimini on notice of the claims asserted in this action (Mot. at 5);
5	
6	• in September 2009, Ravin represented to this Court that Oracle was preparing
7	litigation against Rimini (id. at 6); and
8	• after this litigation was filed, Ravin told the press that Rimini "anticipated" this
9	litigation and prepared for it financially (id. at 4.)
10	Rimini not only fails to dispute these facts, it fails to even specifically argue that it did not see
11	litigation as probable. Instead, Rimini agues it took adequate measures. (Opp. at 9.) It is wrong.
12	1. <u>Rimini's "Pre-Suit Document Policies" Are No Substitute for Preservation</u>
13	Rimini argues that, even if it took no affirmative steps to preserve evidence in light its
14	anticipation of this litigation, the Court can trust that documents were preserved because "Rimini
15	has never had a document destruction policy." (Opp. at 9.)
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21	Indeed area Dimini's being in a healthough of con-
22	Indeed, even Rimini's brief, in a backhanded way,
23	concedes that it had no document retention policy: "Rimini documents were and are maintained
24	indefinitely unless a user made the affirmative decision to delete a particular document." (Opp.
25	at 9.) That is to say, individual users decided what to keep and what to delete. It defies common
26	sense to say that merely because Rimini supposedly did not <i>require</i> documents to be destroyed,
27	they never would be. Unless told to do otherwise, many people clean their offices and their
28	computers and get rid of documents and files they think they no longer need – or that might

1 incriminate them or their employer. For this reason, Rimini's own authorities find a legal hold

notice an indispensible part of preservation. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212,

3 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).

Rimini's own evidence proves the point. Rimini says it does not "auto-delete" emails or put a limit on the size of employee's email inboxes. (Opp. at 9.) Thus, Rimini suggests, employees never have any reason to get rid of emails. But Rimini's own evidence shows that they do: since Rimini began taking measures to direct employees to preserve emails for this case, it reports that "the total volume of stored emails has increased nearly 50 percent over the last 6 months," which, according to Rimini, demonstrates that employees are *now* "preserving potentially relevant emails." (Dones Decl. ¶ 9.) But the rapid growth of stored emails also shows that, prior to these measures over the last six months, emails were *not* being preserved. Rimini's email experience disproves its claim that so long as a company does not tell its

The other "pre-suit policies" referenced in Rimini's opposition likewise do not offer any assurance that data on employee hard drives was preserved.

employees to delete files, they will be preserved.¹



Likewise, Rimini offers no argument why the supposed security restrictions protecting a certain subset of information on its servers – namely, the stored Oracle software and support

¹ Oracle's motion is not focused on emails, which Rimini generally stores on servers, but rather is about any relevant information stored on individual employee hard drives, which may include emails deleted from the servers.

materials located in Rimini's archives (Opp. at 10) – serve as a substitute for different

2	information on Rimini employees' hard drives that is not preserved.
3	2. The "Spring of 2009" Third-Party Subpoena Memorandum Was Narrow
4	in Scope and Lacked Any Follow-Up Thus Dimini is left to make an a manuscraphyra singulated in the Spains of 2000 that
5	Thus, Rimini is left to rely on a memorandum circulated in the Spring of 2009 that
6	followed Rimini's receipt of a third-party subpoena in the SAP TN action.
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23	Yet, in
24	its opposition, Rimini claims that the Spring of 2009 memorandum called for the retention of "a
25	number of categories of documents that Oracle now contends are relevant to this litigation."
26	(Opp. at 10.) This typifies Rimini's string of incomplete and inconsistent explanations of what it
27	has done to preserve evidence. Rimini's repeated inability to provide an accurate,
	comprehensive picture of its preservation efforts exacerbates the need for forensic imaging, the
28	_

1	only technique capable of creating a definitive record of what is on employee hard drives and
2	putting an end to the months-long run-around following Rimini's ever-shifting account of what
3	data are preserved and what are not. ²
4	In any event, the Spring of 2009 memorandum is deficient to meet Rimini's preservation
5	obligations in two respects. ³ First, the memorandum does not even request that employees
6	preserve all of the information relevant to this lawsuit. To the contrary, as described by Rimini,
7	the memorandum was drafted to preserve evidence responsive to third-party subpoenas issued to
8	Ravin and Rimini. (Ringgenberg Reply Decl. Ex. GG.) The memorandum is narrow as a
9	result. ⁴ For example, as described by Rimini, the memorandum sought preservation of
10	"checklists or other documents designed to track the development of tax updates," (Opp. at
11	10-11) excluding wide swaths of other evidence regarding Rimini's use of Oracle software in its
12	
13	Rimini defends its failure to disclose the Spring 2009 memorandum until now by
14	arguing that Oracle's 30(b)(6) deposition only addressed preservation measures taken in this litigation. (Opp. at 11 n. 5.) But the Rule 30(b)(6) notice called for information about "Any
15	steps" taken to "to preserve documents that may be relevant" to this action. (<i>Id.</i>)
16	Rimini cannot invoke the Spring of 2009 memorandum to argue that it timely preserved documents relevant to this action but then attempt
17	to excuse its failure to disclose the notice by also claiming that the Spring of 2009 memorandum did <i>not</i> preserve documents relevant to this action.
18	The memorandum is also late, coming months after December 2008, when Rimini
19	threatened Oracle with antitrust litigation and when Oracle put Rimini on written notice of the claims at issue in this litigation and its duty to preserve evidence. (Mot. at 16.)
20	When describing the Spring of 2009 memorandum, Rimini's brief quotes the
21	subpoena issued to Rimini nearly verbatim, suggesting that the hold memorandum tracked the subpoenas issued to Rimini and Ravin. The subpoena issued to Ravin focuses on
22	TomorrowNow and SAP, not Rimini, so a memorandum based on that subpoena would not preserve the vast majority of documents relevant to this litigation. The Ravin subpoena mentions
23	Rimini in only two document requests – one asking whether Ravin had recruited any former TomorrowNow employees and one asking for any documents comparing TomorrowNow and
24	Rimini. (Ringgenberg Reply Decl. Ex. GG at 7-8) (Requests 5, 10.) The subpoena issued to Rimini includes only the three document requests listed in Rimini's brief, that is, 1) Rimini's
25	business model, 2) Rimini's use of automated tools to download Oracle software, and 3) checklists designed to track the development, testing, documentation, packaging, or delivery of
26	tax updates. (Id. at 32-33.) As explained above, these three requests are far narrower than the
27	issues in this litigation. The memorandum tracking the subpoenas is thus of limited use to Rimini's document preservation efforts related to this litigation.

I	development of tax updates, and including absolutely nothing about development of non-tax
2	patches and updates. Rimini's description of the memorandum also does not refer to other
3	important categories of information, such as communications among Rimini employees about
4	downloading and copying Oracle software. (Id.)
5	Second, Rimini identifies no meaningful follow-up to the single memorandum. As
6	shown in Oracle's motion and undisputed by Rimini, such "notify and hope" preservation
7	measures fail as a matter of law. See, e.g., Treppel v. Biovail Corp., 249 F.R.D. 111, 118
8	(S.D.N.Y. 2008) ("it is not sufficient to notify all employees of a litigation hold and expect the
9	party will then retain and produce all relevant information") (citation omitted); see also cases
10	cited in Mot. at 18-19.
11	Rimini has itself provided quantitative proof that the Spring of 2009 memorandum did
12	not adequately preserve evidence. As noted above, Rimini itself calculated that its
13	implementation of a new hold notice in February of 2010 caused the size of its e-mail stores to
14	grow 50% in six months. (Dones Decl. \P 9.) If employees had been preserving relevant
15	evidence since the Spring of 2009, then there would have been no reason for such dramatic
16	growth starting later.
17	Put simply, starting in at least December 2008, Rimini anticipated this lawsuit, but did
18	not take adequate steps to preserve files on employee hard drives.
19	3. <u>Rimini's Post-Lawsuit Litigation Hold Likewise Depends on Employee</u> Discretion
20	Oracle also showed that, even after Rimini was sued in this action and its counsel issued
21	litigation hold notices by emails, Rimini's preservation efforts with regard to data on employee
22	hard drives have depended centrally on the discretion of individual employees. (Mot. at 18.)
23	Rimini says it is "beyond disingenuous to suggest that Rimini's preservation" efforts were "left
24	to the discretion of individual, non-lawyer employees." (Opp. at 11.) Rimini's brief ignores the
25	testimony of its own Rule 30(b)(6) designee on this topic, who was quite clear that Rimini's
26	counsel merely sent two e-mails requesting preservation and hoped employees would comply:
27	



Rimini attempts to distract the Court from its failure to preserve employees' hard drives by describing its preservation efforts directed elsewhere, namely a "snapshot" it took of company email and client archives found on Rimini servers. (Opp. at 12.) But those measures do nothing to preserve information on employees' hard drives.

4. Rimini Admittedly Failed to Preserve Instant Messages

Rimini's IMs are a specific example of evidence that Rimini's employees failed to preserve despite receiving a litigation hold notice supposedly instructing them to preserve all relevant evidence. Rimini has conceded many employees failed to preserve IMs until at least August 2010. (Ringgenberg Decl. Ex. R at 2-3.)

August 2010. (Ringgenberg Deci. Ex. R at 2-3.)

Rimini

nonetheless offers three arguments that it had no obligation to preserve IMs. None has merit.

<u>First</u>, Rimini offers an unsupported and factually incorrect argument that preserving IMs would be burdensome or would require Rimini to *create* documents because IMs are "ephemeral." (Opp. at 16-17.) Computer scientist Paul Mattal analyzed the instant message tool used by Rimini employees, "Yahoo! Instant Messenger," and demonstrated that instant messages can be preserved with the mere click of a mouse by simply selecting "Yes, save all of my

messages." (Mattal Aff. Ex. 2.)
In August, Rimini agreed to start
preserving IMs, and has offered no technical or practical reason for failing to do so previously.
Mattal also demonstrated that the IMs used by Rimini are not "ephemeral." Rather, in the
default configuration of the application, IMs are saved to a user's hard drive and then deleted.
(Mattal Aff. ¶¶ 9-11.) Preservation of IMs in this circumstance would not require the creation o
any new document; it just requires that documents that already exist on the hard drives not be
deleted.
Second, Rimini's claim that Oracle never asked Rimini to preserve IMs is wrong. On
December 23, 2008, Oracle broadly notified Rimini of its obligation to preserve "all documents"
and "electronic records" that relate to the claims asserted in this case. (Ringgenberg Decl. Ex. F
at 4.) Three days after this case was filed, Oracle reiterated its demand regarding Rimini's
preservation obligations. (Id. Ex. J.) And, in response to a request by Rimini to specify relevant
materials, on March 22, 2010, Oracle requested that Rimini preserve all "communications
between Rimini Street employees concerning the downloading or copying of any Oracle
software and support materials." (Id. Ex. M at 2.) That plainly includes IMs between Rimini
employees. After Oracle learned at the August 12 Rule 30(b)(6) deposition that Rimini was not
preserving IMs, Oracle demanded the next day that Rimini begin to do so. (<i>Id.</i> Ex. EE at 2-3.) ⁵
Third, Rimini fails in its effort to find caselaw establishing IMs as somehow beyond the
scope of preservation or discovery. Rimini's authorities are inapposite; most address the
preservation of data that, unlike Rimini's IMs, require far more than just a few clicks to preserve

1 See Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc., No. 04 Civ. 5316, 2006 WL 3851151, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 2 Dec. 22, 2006) (chat room programs that used a technology that "did not provide a ready means 3 for retaining such communications"); Convolve v. Compaq Computer Corp., 223 F.R.D. 162, 4 177 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) ("preservation of the wave forms in a tangible state would have required heroic efforts"). In fact, courts have repeatedly recognized the importance of preserving and 5 6 producing relevant IMs. See, e.g., Passlogix, Inc. v. 2FA Technology, LLC, F. Supp. 2d , 7 No. 08 Civ. 10986, 2010 WL 1702216, at *31 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2010) (finding that defendants 8 breached their duty to preserve documents by not preserving instant messages sent using Skype 9 program); In re Motor Fuel Temperature Sales Practices Litig., No. 07-MD-1840, 2009 WL 3045718, at *3 n.22, *4 (D. Kan Sept. 21, 2009) (ordering production of relevant IMs); Swofford 10 11 v. Eslinger, 671 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1284 (M.D. Fla. 2009) (imposing sanctions for destroying 12 laptop containing incriminating instant message conversation); Quotient, Inc. v. Toon, No. 13-C-05-64087, 2005 WL 400649, at *3 (Md. Cir. Ct. Dec. 23, 2005) (ordering forensic image of 13 14 defendant's hard drive to preserve instant messages). 5. Rimini's Collection for Production Is Not a Substitute for Preservation 15 16 Finally, Rimini relies on its collection of documents from 30 custodians for production as 17 a substitute for preservation efforts. (Opp. at 12-13.) But that does nothing to preserve any documents from its remaining 170 employees. And Rimini has yet to demonstrate that its 18 19 collection procedure sufficiently preserved even those 30 employees' data. Rimini does not say what types of data were collected, whether counsel collected any metadata or ensured that the **20** 21 metadata was not altered during collection. (Dones Decl. ¶ 19.) Rimini does not contend that 22 counsel collected any IMs. (Id.) And Rimini provides no detail regarding the preservation 23 ⁶ Another order cited by Rimini was the result of a stipulation and reflects no judicial 24 determination. Case Management Order No. 11, In re Yasmin and Yaz (Drospirenone) Mktg., 25 Sales Practices and Prods. Liab. Litig., No 3:09-md-02100, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Feb. 18, 2010). And in Children's Legal Services v. Kresch, No. 07-cv-10255, 2007 WL 4098203 (E.D. Mich. Nov. **26** 16, 2007), the court denied an entire production request in which instant messaging usernames was just one item requested. 27

ir	nstructions 1	that counsel gave to these 30 employees. (<i>Id.</i> $\P\P$ 18-19.)	
	В.	Forensic Images Are a Necessary and Reasonable Preservation Measure	1
	Forer	ensic imaging is the most effective way to ensure preservation of information,	
r	ncluding del	eleted IMs and other deleted files, on Rimini's employees' computers. Rimini de	oes
(ot dispute tl	this. Instead, Rimini incorrectly asserts that the burden would outweigh the bene	efit.
		1. The Benefit of Forensic Images Would Be Substantial	
	Here,	e, forensic images of Rimini's computers are critical. Oracle alleges that Rimini	
O'	wnloads C	Oracle software and support materials in an indiscriminate manner without regar	d for
/h	nat Rimini	i's customers are licensed to use. (FAC $\P\P$ 6, 8, 42.) Oracle also alleges that one	ce
ii	mini does	s this, it cross-uses software obtained on one customer's behalf for the benefit of	othe
u	stomers, ir	in violation of the customer's license agreements with Oracle. (Id. ¶¶ 59, 76.)	
ı			
		Forensic images of thos	se
a	rd drives v	will preserve what files exist, including any files deleted by employees (whether	
		or to conceal wrongdoing) to the extent such files still remain.	
0		ini's assertion (Opp. at 10, 12) that it has preserved the end result of these process	ggog
		vnloaded materials in customer folders in a read-only format, is wholly inadequation of the customer folders in a read-only format, is wholly inadequation to the customer folders in a read-only format, is wholly inadequation.	
		egations of improper downloading and impermissible cross-use relate directly to	
1	e software	e got there. Forensic images of relevant hard drives, if the underlying data has no	ot
	een already	y destroyed, should have the electronic footprints showing Rimini's steps.	
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3	The preservation of electronic evidence thus takes on a heightened
4	importance because historical, deleted, overwritten, edited, or transferred data is highly relevant
5	to the litigation. See, e.g., Genworth Fin. Wealth Mgt., Inc. v. McMullan, 267 F.R.D. 443,
6	448 (D. Conn. 2010) ("[t]here is a sufficient nexus between Genworth's claims and its need to
7	obtain a mirror image of the computer's hard drive, warranting the imaging requested by the
8	Plaintiff").
9	Rimini's cases are in accord: forensic imaging is warranted where computer evidence is
10	likely relevant. See, e.g., Balboa Threadworks, Inc. v. Stucky, No. 05-1157, 2006 WL 763668,
11	*4 (D. Kan. Mar. 24, 2006) (noting that "because the alleged infringement in this case is claimed
12	to have occurred through the use of computers to download copyrighted material, the important
13	and relevance of computer evidence is particularly important"); Antioch Co. v. Scrapbook
14	Borders, Inc., 210 F.R.D. 645, 651-53 (D. Minn. 2002) (granting plaintiff's motion for forensic
15	imaging and inspection of defendants' hard drives and noting that "it is a well accepted
16	proposition that deleted computer files, whether they be e-mails or otherwise, are discoverable'
17	see also Simon Prop. Group L.P. v. mySimon, Inc., 194 F.R.D. 639, 641 (S.D. Ind. 2000)
18	(ordering forensic inspection of relevant computers); Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Welles, 60 F.
19	Supp. 2d 1050, 1054-55 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (same). ⁷
20	Of course, "compelled forensic imaging is not appropriate in all cases." John B. v. Goe
21	531 F.3d 448, 460 (6th Cir. 2008). But the specifics of this case establish that imaging is not ju
22	"appropriate," but necessary, given the importance of the data and Rimini's failures to preserve
23	data found only on individuals' hard drives. See Treppel, 249 F.R.D. at 124 (ordering forensic
24	inspection of inadequately preserved hard drive). As shown above, Rimini failed since at least
25	
26	The string cite Rimini lists in a footnote simply demonstrates that forensic imaging is
27	warranted where the requesting party demonstrates a need for forensic images. (Opp. at 14 n.8 The paramount importance of ESI to the subject matter of this case and the evidence that Rimin has not adequately preserved ESI on employees' hard drives demonstrates such a need.
28	has not adequately preserved ESI on employees hard drives demonstrates such a need.

1	December 2008 to take adequate steps to ensure that employees preserved evidence on their hard
2	drives, making inevitable the deletion of relevant evidence.
3	
4	
5	But Rimini failed to ensure that IMs in this case were preserved. Deleted IMs and other
6	deleted files now sit on Rimini's employees' hard drives, at risk of being overwritten every day
7	by new files. (Mattal Aff. $\P\P$ 5, 12.) Forensic imaging will protect absolutely the files that
8	remain on those hard drives, including what is left of those deleted IMs and other deleted files,
9	making them available for recovery. Without forensic images, other files will be deleted, and
10	files already deleted are likely to be gone forever.
11	This is not a mere "fishing expedition" or some effort to "unleash every new
12	technologyto try and find information," as Rimini suggests. (Opp. at 21-22.) This is an effort
13	to preserve basic data relevant to Oracle's claims that, because of Rimini's failures, may now be
14	preserved only through forensic imaging. Where "there is simply no other way in which to seek
15	this information," forensic imaging is warranted. Covad Comm'ns Co. v. Revonet, Inc., 258
16	F.R.D. 5, 13 (D.D.C. 2009).
17	2. <u>The Burden Would Not Be Undue</u>
18	Rimini's opposition asserts that forensic imaging could cost up to \$200,000. This is
19	grossly exaggerated in at least two respects. First, Oracle does not ask that Rimini image each of
20	its 200 employees' computers. Oracle has proposed that the parties agree on 60 custodians per
21	side from which to produce documents, and the parties are conferring regarding the number and
22	identify of custodians. Oracle only seeks forensic imaging of the same individuals.
23	Second, Rimini's estimate of the costs per computer is substantially overstated.
24	
25	
26	As the
27	declaration of an experienced computer forensics technician demonstrates,
28	Where the subjects are far-flung, the imaging can be conducted remotely, and this 13

1	process can be conducted overnight, avoiding interrupting the employee's use of the computer		
2	during business hours. (Cheng Decl. ¶¶ 8, 11.)		
3			
4	in line with the estimate provided by Oracle that 50 computers could be		
5	imaged for as little as \$10,000 and no more than \$25,0000. (Cheng Decl. $\P\P$ 8-12.) Such an		
6	expense is hardly unreasonable given Rimini's size, revenues, and the magnitude of the issues at		
7	stake - including whether Rimini's business model is fundamentally legal.		
8	Rimini also asserts that the costs of imaging "pale in comparison" to the costs of		
9	reviewing such documents for privilege and relevance. (Opp. at 19.) But Oracle has only asked		
10	Rimini to create and preserve forensic images to ensure that no more data is lost, not, at this		
11	stage, to produce forensic images. See Covad, 258 F.R.D. at 9 (distinguishing between a request		
12	for the creation of forensic images and a more intrusive request for a forensic inspection). The		
13	case Rimini cites to demonstrate that forensic imaging is burdensome actually addresses the		
14	more time-consuming request for forensic investigation of forensic images, not just preparation		
15	of the image itself. See Powers v. Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch., No 5:05-cv-117, 2006 WL		
16	2711512, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 21, 2006).		
17	It is premature for the parties or the Court to determine what searching and analysis of the		
18	forensic data should be undertaken because the parties are just now completing the foundational		
19	discovery period. After Oracle receives and is able to digest additional documents and data, the		
20	need for any forensic analysis and its appropriate scope will be more clear. But it is important		
21	that the forensic evidence be <i>preserved</i> now, for otherwise relevant information that may be		
22	needed will be lost and irretrievable.		
23	C. Rimini Should Bear the Costs of Forensic Imaging		
24	Finally, Rimini makes much of its supposed "compromise" in which Rimini would		
25	control forensic imaging of its computers but Oracle would foot the bill. (Opp. at 1.) Rimini's		
26	approach would reverse our litigation system's basic presumption that the producing party bears		
27	the cost of production. See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 317 (S.D.N.Y.		
28	2003) (further noting that "[a]ny principled approach to electronic evidence must respect that 14		

1 presumption"). Such cost-shifting is not appropriate unless discovery imposes an "undue" 2 burden. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). As explained above, forensic imaging imposes no undue burden 3 here, and cost shifting is thus inappropriate. 4 Rimini also overlooks that forensic imaging is necessary here because of its own failure 5 to preserve its employees' hard drives and to timely discuss its preservation efforts. Where a 6 defendant has "failed to take adequate measures to prevent the destruction of discoverable 7 materials," courts have permitted the plaintiff to conduct a forensic search – not just imaging – 8 of the relevant computer at defendants' expense. Treppel, 249 F.R.D. at 124. For example, in 9 Genworth Fin. Wealth Mgt., Inc. v. McMullan, 267 F.R.D. 443 (D. Conn. 2010), the court 10 ordered defendants to pay for a forensic investigation because of defendants' failure to preserve 11 "relevant information, that the Defendants were required to maintain and preserve, [which] 12 necessitates the retention of a neutral forensic expert to ascertain what, if any, data existed on 13 any and all computer and electronic storage devices to which the Defendants had access during the relevant time period." *Id.* at 448. Shifting the costs of forensic imaging or inspection to the 14 15 receiving party is not appropriate where the producing party's failure to adequately preserve 16 evidence created the need for forensic imaging in the first place. See, e.g., Preferred Care 17 Partners Holding Corp. v. Humana, Inc., No. 08-CV-20424, 2009 WL 982460, at *17 (S.D. Fla. 18 Apr. 9, 2009) (allowing forensic examination at producing party's expense because of discovery 19 failings). **20** III. CONCLUSION 21 For the reasons expressed above, Oracle respectfully requests that the Court enter 22 Oracle's Proposed Preservation Order. 23 24 25 **26** ⁸ The Genworth court apportioned 80% costs of the forensic inspection to defendants and 20% to plaintiffs. Because Oracle has asked for the less burdensome measure of forensic imaging, no 27 such cost-shifting is necessary here.

1	DATED: September 3, 2010	BOIES SCHILLER & FLEXNER LLP
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3		By: /s/ Kieran P. Ringgenberg Kieran P. Ringgenberg
5		Attorneys for Plaintiffs Oracle USA, Inc., Oracle America, Inc.,
6		and Oracle International Corp.
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1	<u>CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE</u>	
2	I hereby certify that on the 3rd day of September, 2010, I electronically transmitted the	
3	foregoing PLAINTIFFS ORACLE USA, INC., ORACLE AMERICA, INC., AND	
4	ORACLE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION	
5	FOR PRESERVATION ORDER [REDACTED] to the Clerk's Office using the CM/ECF	
6	System for filing and transmittal of a Notice of Electronic Filing to all counsel in this matter; all	
7	counsel being registered to receive Electronic Filing.	
8		
9	/s/ Catherine Duong	
10	An employee of Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP	
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